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KANT ON EMPIRICISM  
AND RATIONALISM
Alberto Vanzo
This paper aims to correct some widely held misconceptions concern-ing Kant’s role in the formation of a widespread narrative of early 
modern philosophy.1 According to this narrative, which dominated the 
English-speaking world throughout the twentieth century,2 the early 
modern period was characterized by the development of two rival schools: 
René Descartes’s, Baruch Spinoza’s, and G. W. Leibniz’s rationalism; 
and John Locke’s, George Berkeley’s, and David Hume’s empiricism. 
Empiricists and rationalists disagreed on whether all concepts are de-
rived from experience and whether humans can have any substantive 
a priori knowledge, a priori knowledge of the physical world, or a priori 
metaphysical knowledge.3 The early modern period came to a close, so 
the narrative claims, once Immanuel Kant, who was neither an empiri-
cist nor a rationalist, combined the insights of both movements in his 
new Critical philosophy. In so doing, Kant inaugurated the new eras of 
German idealism and late modern philosophy.
 Since the publication of influential studies by Louis Loeb and David 
Fate Norton,4 the standard narrative of early modern philosophy has 
come increasingly under attack. Critics hold that histories of early 
modern philosophy based on the rationalism-empiricism distinction 
(RED) have three biases—three biases for which, as we shall see, Kant 
is often blamed.
 The Epistemological Bias. Since disputes regarding a priori knowledge 
belong to epistemology, the RED is usually regarded as an epistemologi-
cal distinction.5 Accordingly, histories of early modern philosophy based 
on the RED tend to assume that the core of early modern philosophy 
lies in the conflict between the “competing and mutually exclusive epis-
temologies” of “rationalism and empiricism.”6 They typically interpret 
most of the central doctrines, developments, and disputes of the period 
in the light of philosophers’ commitment to empiricist or rationalist 
epistemologies. As a result, they have been criticized for the following:
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— misinterpreting those disputes between so-called empiricists and 
rationalists that derived from divergences on ontological issues, 
rather than epistemology;7
— subordinating the ethics and aesthetics of early modern philoso-
phers to their epistemology, even when they were independent 
from epistemological matters;8
— marginalizing political philosophy because of its independence 
from epistemology.9
An author has the epistemological bias if he interprets most or all of 
(those that he identifies as) the central philosophical doctrines, de-
velopments, and disputes of the early modern period in the light of 
philosophers’ commitment to empiricism or rationalism.
 The Kantian Bias. Histories of early modern philosophy based on the 
RED tend to portray Kant as the first author who uncovered the limits 
of empiricism and rationalism, rejected their mistakes, and incorporated 
their correct insights within his Critical philosophy.10 This interpretation 
relies on the view that Kant’s Critical philosophy is a superior alterna-
tive to empiricism and rationalism—not just a superior empiricist or 
rationalist alternative to earlier forms of empiricism and rationalism, 
but a superior alternative to empiricism and rationalism as such. In 
order to have the Kantian bias, one must endorse this view.
 The Classificatory Bias. Typically, histories of philosophy based on 
the RED classify most or all early modern philosophers prior to Kant 
into either the empiricist or the rationalist camps. However, these clas-
sifications have proven far from convincing. Some claim that canonical 
empiricists were, in fact, rationalists or vice versa.11 Others claim that 
canonical empiricists or rationalists were both empiricists and rational-
ists, neither empiricists nor rationalists, or occupied an intermediate 
position between the two camps.12 Yet others note that the traditional 
classifications invite historians to assume that “successive figures apply 
the school’s basic (rationalist or empiricist) principles with increasing 
rigor to a common body of problems, ultimately carrying them through 
to their ‘logical conclusion.’”13 This led historians to overestimate the 
degree of continuity within each camp; underestimate the manifold 
positive influences of earlier empiricists on later rationalists and earlier 
rationalists on later empiricists;14 and overlook the affinities between 
the views of empiricists like Berkeley and Hume and those of rational-
ists like Malebranche and Leibniz.15 Thus, standard histories of early 
modern philosophy have a classificatory bias that consists in classifying 
most or all early modern authors as empiricists or rationalists.
 It is often alleged that Kant introduced the three biases that plague 
much post-Kantian historiography. As for the classificatory bias, Kant 
is said to have “argued, in the Critique of Pure Reason, that empiri-
cism and rationalism represent two comprehensive options, and that 
the philosophers of his day were drawn respectively to one or other 
of them.”16 “[T]his was the easiest way to describe the development of 
philosophy in the two centuries prior to Kant in the light of his own 
problem:”17 namely, an epistemological problem. Kant allegedly had 
the epistemological bias because he reduced “the history of modern 
philosophy to an epistemological clash between rationalism and em-
piricism.”18 He did this to “argue for a third option, his own, which 
incorporated, as he saw it, what was true in both [empiricism and 
rationalism], while avoiding their errors.”19 He exhibited the Kan-
tian bias by recommending his own philosophy as the “‘true middle 
course’ between the self-revealing one-sidedness of empiricism and 
 rationalism.”20
 This paper provides an alternative account of Kant’s contribution to 
the development of the standard narrative. The paper argues for the 
following claims:
1. Kant is not directly responsible for the three biases of the stan-
dard historiography. In fact, Kant did not have any of the three 
biases. He did not regard most or all early modern philosophers 
as empiricists or rationalists. He did not regard his own philoso-
phy as an alternative to empiricism and rationalism as such but, 
rather, as a form of rationalism. And he did not interpret most 
or all of the main philosophical doctrines, developments, and 
disputes of the early modern period in the light of philosophers’ 
commitment to empiricism or rationalism.
2. However, Kant made three indirect contributions to the develop-
ment of the standard narrative:
(a) He formulated the notions of empiricism and rationalism that 
are at the basis of the standard narrative, and he employed 
them in his sketches of the history of modern philosophy.
(b) He outlined, most notably in the antinomies, a dialectical 
pattern of argument that would inform the standard narra-
tive.
(c) He promoted a way of writing histories of philosophy that, 
once combined with (a) and (b), would give rise to the biases 
of the standard narrative.
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By arguing for these claims, the paper provides a first step toward a 
comprehensive reconstruction of the history of the standard narrative 
of early modern philosophy.
 The paper is divided into seven sections. Section 1 outlines Kant’s 
notions of empiricism and its rivals. Section 2 examines the role of the 
RED in Kant’s sketches of the history of philosophy. Sections 3 to 5 ar-
gue that Kant did not have the three biases. Section 6 highlights Kant’s 
indirect contributions to the development of the standard narrative. 
Some conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
1. thRee eMpiRiciSMS and theiR RivalS
Kant’s Critical works contain three different notions of empiricism. 
They all relate to sensory experience, albeit in different ways. The first, 
which I will call immodest empiricism, is the denial that nonsensible 
objects exist. The second, modest empiricism, is the denial that we can 
experience certain items, regardless of whether they exist. The third, 
history-empiricism, is the denial that we can form concepts or justify 
synthetic judgments a priori, independently from experience.
 Immodest empiricism is introduced in the Antinomy chapter of the 
Critique of Pure Reason. Kant writes that, because of their “essential 
distinguishing mark,” the theses can be called “the dogmatism of pure 
reason,” whereas the antitheses conform to “a principle of pure em-
piricism” (A465–66/B493–94). To clarify what the “principle of pure 
empiricism” and the “distinguishing mark” of dogmatism are, it is 
important to recall how the theses diverge from the antitheses. They 
diverge on whether certain items exist. The theses are distinctive of 
dogmatism and assert the existence of a beginning of the world, spatial 
boundaries of the world, indivisible objects, contracausal free actions, 
and a necessary being. The antitheses express an empiricist position 
and deny the existence of those items.
 Empiricists deny their existence because they take the possibility of 
having sensory experience of an item as a necessary condition for its 
existence (A468/B496). According to empiricists,
[Immodest Empiricism] only sensible objects exist.
The reason for the charge of immodesty will become clear in what follows. 
In Kant’s view, humans could never have sensory experience of the items 
the antinomies are about: a moment prior to which the world did not 
exist, spatial boundaries of the world, objects without parts, and so on. 
Humans cannot infer the existence of those items on the basis of experi-
ence either. They are not sensible objects. Therefore, empiricists deny 
their existence. For instance, empiricists deny the existence of simple 
objects because they “can never be exhibited in concreto either in sense 
or imagination” (A469/B497). They reject contracausal freedom because 
it “cannot be encountered in any experience” (A447/B475), and so on.
Against empiricists, dogmatists claim that
[Antinomy-Dogmatism] there are nonsensible objects. 
In their view, sound deductive arguments prove the existence of nonsen-
sible, “intellectual starting points” of the world (A466/B494): a beginning 
of the world, indivisible atoms, contra-causal freedom, and so on. Kant’s 
use of the term “dogmatism” to refer to this position is more specific than 
Kant’s broad sense of “dogmatism.” Dogmatism in the broad sense is
[Broad Dogmatism] the presumption of being able to acquire 
metaphysical knowledge by means of a priori reasonings, without a 
prior inquiry into whether metaphysical knowledge lies within hu-
man grasp.21
Not only the supporters of the theses but also the empiricists that en-
dorse the antitheses are dogmatists in the broad sense. In fact, Kant 
qualifies the empiricism of the antinomies as dogmatic (A471/B499).
 As is well known, Kant rejects this dogmatic form of empiricism. In 
his view, empiricists should not claim that the world is eternal, that it 
is infinitely extended, and that all bodies are divisible.22 They should 
only claim that we can continue indefinitely in discovering new regions 
of the world, identifying earlier causes of past events, and dividing each 
body into increasingly smaller parts (A517–27/B545–55). Empiricists 
should endorse a modest form of empiricism:
[Modest Empiricism] “in the empirical regress there can be encoun-
tered no experience of an absolute boundary, and hence no experience 
of a condition as one that is absolutely unconditioned empirically.” 
(A517/B545) 
This empiricism is modest because it warrants claims on only what we 
can experience, not on what exists or does not exist beyond the bounds 
of experience. Modest empiricism is as consistent with dogmatism and 
the positive claims of the theses as it is with immodest empiricism and 
the negative claims of the antitheses.
 The third notion of empiricism can be found in the last section of 
the first Critique, titled “The History of Pure Reason.” Kant states that 
philosophers can be empiricists or noologists “with regard to the origin 
of pure cognitions of reason” (A854/B882). Empiricists claim that those 
cognitions “are derived from experience.” Noologists claim that, “inde-
pendent from” experience, pure cognitions of reason “have their source 
in reason” (A854/B882). The cognitions that Kant is referring to are 
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concepts and judgments. As for concepts, empiricists “take all concepts 
of the understanding from experience” (Metaphysik Mrongovius, 29:763). 
As for judgments, empiricists claim that no synthetic judgments can 
have an a priori justification. Kant’s proof that such judgments exist 
makes empiricism “completely untenable.”23 In synthesis, the empiricists 
of the “History of Pure Reason” claim that
[History-Empiricism] all concepts are formed a posteriori, and all 
synthetic judgments can be justified only a posteriori.
By contrast, noologists hold that
[Noologism] some concepts are not formed a posteriori, and some 
synthetic judgments are justified a priori.
“Rationalism” is the term that Kant uses from the late 1780s onward to 
designate noologism, that is, the admission of nonempirical concepts and 
a priori principles. For instance, Kant’s unfinished manuscript on the 
Progress of Metaphysics states that an affirmative answer to the question 
as to whether all knowledge must “be derived solely from experience 
. . . would inaugurate the empiricism of transcendental philosophy, and 
a negative one the rationalism [not “noologism”] of the same” (20:275). 
Thus, Kant identifies the RED with the distinction between empiricism 
and noologism that he first drew in the “History of Pure Reason.”
2. eMpiRiciSM and RationaliSM  
in Kant’S hiStoRy of philoSophy
Kant employs the notions of empiricism and rationalism in his sketches 
of the history of ancient and modern philosophy.24 Some ancient philoso-
phers, like Socrates, focused only on practical philosophy. Those who 
had a theoretical philosophy were either dogmatists or skeptics.25 Un-
surprisingly, Kant identifies a central problem of his own philosophy as 
a main source of disputes between dogmatists: What is the origin of our 
intellectual concepts?26 Depending on how philosophers answered that 
question, Kant divides them into philosophers “ex principiis sensitivis” 
and philosophers “ex principiis rationalibus” (Refl. 1636 [1760–72?], 
16:60), that is, empiricists and noologists or rationalists. Interestingly, 
some lecture transcripts differentiate not two, but three positions: 
mysticism, empiricism, and rationalism.27 These classifications are 
summarized in Diagram 1.
 According to mystical philosophers, our concepts do not differ in kind 
from perceptions or, to use Kant’s term, intuitions. Concepts are intu-
itions stored in memory. The intellect, not the senses, generated those 
intuitions. Our intellect has a quasi-perceptual capacity to apprehend 
concepts, in the same way in which our senses have the capacity to 
apprehend sensory stimuli. The paradigmatic example of this view is 
Plato. Kant’s lecture transcripts portray his doctrine of reminiscence as 
a sort of Malebranchean vision in God. During an earlier life, we had
an intuition of God from which we derived all remaining ideas, [and] 
of which we now have only weak memories, that occur to us on the 
occasion of sensible appearances. Now we no longer have this because 
our soul is locked up in our body as though in a prison.28 
Our concepts are faded copies of the intuitions that we had in that previ-
ous life, when our soul was looking directly into God’s mind.29
 Unlike Plato, rationalist philosophers differentiate concepts from 
intuitions, but, unlike Aristotle, they do not take intellectual concepts to 
have empirical origin. This view was not instantiated in antiquity. It can 
be found only among the moderns, starting with Leibniz. He “believed 
in innate ideas,” but, unlike Plato, he “left the mystical aside” by dis-
tinguishing ideas from intellectual intuitions (Metaphysik Mrongovius, 
29:761, 763).
 Empiricists, too, distinguish concepts from intuitions. They claim 
that all concepts are acquired a posteriori on the basis of sensations. 
The paradigmatic examples of this view are Aristotle and Epicurus in 
antiquity, Locke and Hume in modern times. Aristotle’s intellectual 
concepts are similar to Locke’s concepts of reflection. “Aristotle says: the 
concepts of the understanding are not innate but rather acquired, we 
Diagram 1: A classification of ancient philosophers  
in Kant’s lecture transcripts.
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ff
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Dogmatists
ff
Sceptics

Empiricists
ff
[Rationalists]

Mystics
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obtained them on the occasion of experience, when we reflect upon the 
objects of the senses.”30 Aristotle and Locke trespassed the boundaries of 
their professed empiricism when they claimed that “the existence of God 
can be proven from experience . . . ; but since God cannot be an object 
of experience, how should I come to know his existence? Therefore the 
system of Locke and Aristotle is inconsistent.”31
 Epicurus and Hume were more consistent than Aristotle and Locke 
because they did not assert the existence of God, human freedom, or the 
immortality of the soul. In fact, they rejected metaphysics altogether 
(Metaphysik von Schön, 28:466; Metaphysik K3, 29:953) and confined 
themselves to physics. Within that discipline, Hume endorsed a “univer-
sal empiricism of principles” (KprV, 5:13). A cornerstone of this position is 
Hume’s psychological account of the origin of the notion of cause (KprV, 
5:51). This doctrine led to an unwelcome consequence: “the most rigorous 
skepticism with respect to the whole of natural science,” especially “with 
respect to inferences rising from effects to causes” (KprV, 5:51–52). For 
Kant, the skeptical consequences of Humean empiricism are as unac-
ceptable as the contradictions arising from dogmatism, highlighted in 
the antinomies. Having ruled out dogmatism as well as skepticism, Kant 
concludes the “History of Pure Reason” by claiming that “[t]he critical 
path alone is still open” (A856/B884).
3. the claSSificatoRy BiaS
Having surveyed Kant’s distinctions between empiricism and its rivals 
and the role of the RED in Kant’s comments on the history of philosophy, 
we can determine whether Kant has the classificatory bias, the Kantian 
bias, and the epistemological bias. Kant will have the classificatory bias 
if he claims that most or all of his early modern predecessors are either 
empiricists or rationalists. We have seen that Kant classes two early 
modern philosophers as empiricists: John Locke and David Hume (for 
example, A854/B882; KprV, 5:13, 50–53). Kant classes only one early 
modern philosopher, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, as a rationalist (A854/
B882). These classifications are represented in Table 1 (with an addition 
that will be explained in the next section).
 Empiricists Rationalists
 Locke Leibniz
 Hume Kant
Table 1: Early modern philosophers that Kant explicitly 
classes as empiricists or rationalists.
 There are good reasons to hold that Kant regards other early modern 
philosophers as rationalists or empiricists, as summarized in Table 2 
below.
1. The Metaphysik Mrongovius (29:761) associates Christian Au-
gust Crusius with Plato and Leibniz. This suggests that Kant 
takes Crusius to be a rationalist.
2. By combining two passages from the second Critique (5:40, 
70–71), one can infer that Kant regards Michel de Mon-
taigne, Bernard Mandeville, and Francis Hutcheson as 
moral empiricists, Christian Wolff and Crusius as moral 
rationalists. Moral rationalists establish whether an action 
is morally good on the basis of its conformity to an a priori 
law. Moral empiricists establish whether an action is mor-
ally good on the basis of its consequences, namely, whether 
it promotes one’s happiness.
3. By combining two passages from the third Critique (5:277–78, 
346–51), one can infer that Kant would call Edmund Burke 
an empiricist about beauty. Aesthetic empiricists claim that 
judgments of taste can be based only on empirical principles. 
Aesthetic rationalists claim that whether an object is beautiful 
depends on its conformity with an a priori principle.
4. Kant does not mention any aesthetic rationalists in the third 
Critique. However, he criticizes a form of aesthetic rationalism 
that assimilates beauty to perfection.32 It is not difficult to iden-
tify this view with those of Wolff, Alexander Baumgarten, and 
Georg Friedrich Meier, all authors whom Kant knew well.
 Empiricists Rationalists
In general  Crusius
In ethics Montaigne Wolff
 Mandeville Crusius
 Hutcheson
In aesthetics Burke Wolff
  Baumgarten
  Meier
Table 2: Early modern philosophers that Kant appears  
to regard as empiricists or rationalists.
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In order to extend Kant’s list of empiricists and rationalists, it is tempt-
ing to identify the empiricists and noologists of the “History of Pure 
Reason” with the immodest empiricists and dogmatists of the antino-
mies. This temptation should be resisted because the two distinctions 
do not map onto each another. Immodest empiricists can be noologists. 
They can claim that all objects are sensible and that we know some of 
their features a priori. For instance, we may know a priori that all objects 
are subjected to the causal law. Modest empiricists can be noologists, 
too. As we shall see, Kant himself endorses not only modest empiricism 
but also noologism.
 Additionally, the antinomies do not introduce any clear-cut distinction 
among Kant’s predecessors. For instance, if we look at the first antinomy, 
we find the Newtonian Samuel Clarke endorsing the argument for the 
thesis and the rationalist Leibniz endorsing the argument for the an-
tithesis.33 This is the opposite of what one would expect because Kant 
ascribes the theses to dogmatists and the antitheses to empiricists. If we 
look at the second antinomy, we find both Leibniz and Clarke endorsing 
key assumptions at the basis of the proofs of the thesis and antithesis.34 
Kant reserves the term “rationalism” for the noologism of the “History 
of Pure Reason,” rather than antinomy-dogmatism. It is best to follow 
Kant’s policy and avoid conflating the RED, introduced in the “History 
of Pure Reason,” with the distinction between immodest empiricists and 
antinomy-dogmatists.
 Tables 1 and 2 fail to mention many prominent early modern authors. 
These include canonical empiricists like Francis Bacon, Pierre Gassendi, 
Robert Boyle, and George Berkeley, and canonical rationalists like René 
Descartes and Nicolas Malebranche, in addition to Thomas Hobbes, 
Jean le Rond d’Alembert, Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Claude Helvetius, 
Thomas Reid, James Oswald, James Beattie, and Joseph Priestley. Kant 
mentions them all, but he categorizes none of them as an empiricist or 
a rationalist.35 Since so many authors escape the RED in Kant’s texts, 
Kant is hardly responsible for introducing the classificatory bias within 
the historiography of early modern philosophy.
 I am not claiming that, given Kant’s statements, it would be incon-
sistent for him to have the classificatory bias. Nor am I denying that, 
when Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann and others carried out extensive 
classifications of early modern authors as being either empiricists or 
rationalists, they were acting in a broadly Kantian spirit. Kant often 
looks at earlier philosophers as examples of ideal types like empiri-
cism or rationalism, rather than as exponents of determinate historical 
movements. The classificatory bias that can be found in Tennemann 
and others derives from an extensive application of Kant’s typological 
approach to the history of philosophy. Nevertheless, having the clas-
sificatory bias means classifying most or all early modern authors as 
empiricists or rationalists, and such classifications cannot be found in 
Kant’s texts.
4. the Kantian BiaS
According to several scholars, the only early modern philosopher that 
Kant classes neither as an empiricist nor as a rationalist is himself. By 
placing himself over and above empiricism and rationalism, Kant would 
be the source of the Kantian bias.
 Kant had a lifelong tendency to single out apparently irresoluble 
contrasts between pairs of philosophical theories, only to put forward 
his own views as superior to both alternatives: Newtonian dynamics 
and Leibnizian monadology in physics, dogmatism and skepticism in 
metaphysics, Epicureanism and Stoicism in ethics, realism and sub-
jectivism about beauty. The antinomies of the first Critique provide 
a famous example of this strategy, while introducing the distinction 
between empiricism and dogmatism. It is natural to expect that Kant 
applied his strategy of divide et impera to position his own philosophy 
over and above empiricism and rationalism.
 Contrary to this expectation, Kant’s texts never state that his phi-
losophy is an alternative to empiricism and rationalism as such. There 
are plenty of occasions on which he could have made this claim. For 
instance, Kant makes clear in the “Annotation to the Amphiboly” that he 
takes his philosophy to be superior to those of Locke, who “sensitivized 
the concepts of understanding,” and Leibniz, who “intellectualized the 
appearances” (A271/B327). Since Kant classes Locke as an empiricist 
and Leibniz as a rationalist, the passage indicates that Kant takes his 
philosophy to be superior to their particular brands of empiricism and 
rationalism. Yet neither on this occasion, nor on others, does Kant add 
that his philosophy is superior to empiricism and rationalism as such. 
On the contrary, while he argues in the second Critique that his moral 
philosophy is superior to the moral rationalism of Wolff and Crusius 
and the moral empiricism of Montaigne and others, he still character-
izes his moral philosophy as a kind of rationalism—a “rationalism of 
the capacity of judgment” (KprV, 5:71). Similarly, Kant rejects Burke’s 
empiricism and Wolff ’s rationalism in aesthetics in the third Critique. 
However, he still endorses “rationalism of the principle of taste” (KU, 
5:347). Kant contrasts his own aesthetic rationalism with the rational-
ism of Wolff, Baumgarten, and Meier by qualifying their rationalism as 
realist and his as idealist. He portrays his idealist aesthetic rationalism 
as superior to aesthetic empiricism on the one hand and realist aesthetic 
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rationalism on the other. However, he still characterizes his position as 
a form of rationalism instead of characterizing it, as Kant scholars often 
do,36 as a Critical alternative to aesthetic empiricism and rationalism 
as such.
 Did Kant regard his theoretical philosophy, too, like his ethics and 
aesthetics, as a form of rationalism? Kant’s texts provide three reasons 
to hold that he did.
1. According to the “History of Pure Reason,” noologists hold that 
we have “pure cognitions of reason” and that these “have their 
source in reason,” “independent from” experience (A854/B882). 
Some of the central arguments of the first Critique aim to estab-
lish precisely those claims. Specifically, they argue that some of 
our concepts—the categories—have a nonempirical origin and 
that we can know some synthetic judgments to be true a priori. 
For Kant, these are distinctive views of noologists, that is, ra-
tionalists.
  Note that Kant could not call himself a rationalist if he regarded 
the claim that we have innate concepts as constitutive of ratio-
nalism, as scholars sometimes do.37 Kant agrees with empiricists 
that “all our cognition commences with experience” (B1) and 
that there are “absolutely no implanted or innate representa-
tions” (Entd., 8:221). Kant only ascribes the claim that we have 
pure (that is, nonempirical) concepts to rationalists. He takes 
his categories to be pure, nonempirical concepts because they 
are acquired through a mental process that, albeit triggered by 
experience, “brings them about, a priori, out of” our “cognitive 
faculty,” without relying on any information provided by the 
senses.38 Some Kantian texts refer to this process as the original 
or a priori acquisition of the categories,39 which is parallel to the 
original acquisition of our representation of space (Entd., 8:223).
2. A passage of the Progress of Metaphysics, written in the first 
half of the 1790s and already mentioned, discusses the possible 
answers to the question as to whether “all knowledge” is “to be 
derived solely from experience” (20:275). The text states that a 
negative answer inaugurates “the rationalism” of transcendental 
philosophy. Kant had given such a negative answer a few years 
earlier, at the beginning of the 1787 introduction to the Critique 
of Pure Reason:
As far as time is concerned, then, no cognition in us precedes experi-
ence. . . . But although all our cognition commences with experience, 
yet it does not on that account all arise from experience. (B1) 
  The “Transcendental Aesthetic” and “Transcendental Analytic” 
of the first Critique provide extended arguments for that claim.
3. Three transcripts of Kant’s metaphysics lectures from the first 
half of the 1790s indicate that Kant, at that time, was endorsing 
a form of rationalism. The transcript of Kant’s third lecture from 
the winter semester 1792/1793 outlines his view that concepts 
such as those of cause and effect are not innate but acquired a 
priori. Then, after alluding to alternative positions (Epicurus’s 
empiricism and Plato’s mysticism), the text states, “It is ratio-
nalism that we seek, in fact, we want to regard our cognitions 
as acquired a priori” (28:619). The transcript of this lecture 
ends three sentences later. The transcript of the next lecture 
starts by elaborating on the earlier endorsement of rationalism. 
The text explains that there are two types of rationalism: dog-
matic rationalism and Critical rationalism. The latter “begins 
by inquiring into human reason . . . as regards its extension, 
content and limits” (28:619). As we know from the Prolegomena 
(4:261), the philosophy that Kant took to have first determined 
the extension, content, and limits of human reason is his own 
Critical philosophy. This suggests that Critical rationalism and 
Critical philosophy and identical.
  The Metaphysik K2, based on lectures from the early 1790s, 
outlines the same distinction between dogmatic and Critical 
rationalism and laments that, in the past, “the critical method of 
rationalism has never been followed.”40 This rules out the identi-
fication of Critical rationalism with any pre-Kantian philosophy. 
For the Metaphysik K3, based on lectures from 1794/1795, ratio-
nalism is “the principle of the possibility to represent cognitions 
a priori” (29:953). A priori cognitions are either analytic or 
synthetic. Kant finds the possibility to represent analytic cogni-
tions a priori relatively unproblematic. Instead, the possibility to 
represent synthetic cognitions a priori is as puzzling as it is vital 
for the sorts of metaphysics. As Kant states in the Prolegomena 
(4:278), “[a]ll metaphysicians are . . . solemnly and lawfully sus-
pended from their occupations until such a time as they shall 
have satisfactorily answered the question: How are synthetic 
cognitions a priori possible?” By satisfactorily answering that 
question, Kant’s Critical philosophy provides the foundations 
of the true metaphysics. Accordingly, the Metaphysik K3 calls 
Critical rationalism “the first proposition of all metaphysical 
truths,”41 confirming the identification of Critical rationalism 
with Critical philosophy.
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 Admittedly, the most explicit indications that Kant took his philoso-
phy to be a form of rationalism can be found in lecture notes, which are 
far less reliable than Kant’s own works and must be used with care. 
However, the passages at stake are from three different transcripts. The 
approximate datings of the lectures on which the transcripts are based 
are uncontroversial and can be traced back to a time span of only five 
years (1790–95),42 all well within the Critical period. The meaning of 
each passage taken individually is rather clear, and the passages are 
consistent with one another. They are also consistent with the doctrine 
of the original acquisition that is sketched in several texts from 1770 to 
the 1790s and with statements in the first Critique, the Prolegomena, 
and the Progress of Metaphysics. As we saw above, some of those other 
statements also suggest that Kant took his theoretical philosophy to be 
a form of rationalism. This is in line with Kant’s explicit categorization 
of his ethics and aesthetics as rationalist. For all these reasons, we can 
rely on the collective evidence provided by the lecture transcripts and 
the other texts to conclude that Kant did take his philosophy to be a 
form of rationalism.
 Of course, Kant took his philosophy to be more than just another 
form of rationalism. He regarded it as the only true rationalism. As 
we saw in Section 2, he criticized earlier forms of rationalism as much 
as earlier forms of empiricism. At the same time, he accepted tenets of 
earlier empiricists and rationalists. For instance, he combined Locke’s 
emphasis on the necessity of sensory input for knowledge acquisition 
with Leibniz’s admission of substantive a priori knowledge. Neverthe-
less, Kant did not see his combination of the views of earlier empiricists 
and rationalists as an alternative to empiricism and rationalism as such 
but, rather, as a higher form of rationalism.
 One may question whether Kant was right in viewing his philosophy 
in that way. Few scholars ever claimed that Kant was indeed a rational-
ist, with the notable exceptions of some of his first readers and Erich 
Adickes.43 Most regarded Kant’s philosophy as a via media between 
empiricism and rationalism that is neither empiricist nor rationalist. 
Others, like Wayne Waxman, take Kant’s project to be steeped in Locke’s, 
Berkeley’s, and Hume’s philosophical tradition.44
 However things may be, whether Kant had the Kantian bias does 
not depend on whether his philosophy actually is a form of rationalism, 
empiricism, or neither. One has the Kantian bias if one holds that Kant’s 
Critical philosophy is a superior alternative to empiricism and rational-
ism as such, regardless of whether one is correct in holding this. This 
applies to Kant, too. The evidence assembled in this section establishes 
that he did not take his own philosophy to be an alternative to empiri-
cism and rationalism as such. This is sufficient to conclude that he did 
not have Kantian bias, regardless of whether he was correct in viewing 
his own philosophy as a form of rationalism.
5. the epiSteMological BiaS
It is hard to deny that epistemology occupies an important place within 
Kant’s philosophical project. In the theoretical sphere, Kant answers the 
“general question” as to the possibility of metaphysics (Prol., 4:271) by 
determining the possibility, extent, and boundaries of a priori knowledge. 
In the practical sphere, Kant defends the possibility of moral respon-
sibility by relying on the assumption that we cannot know whether 
our actions are free or determined. However, whether Kant had the 
epistemological bias that is at issue in this paper does not depend on 
whether he ascribed an important place to epistemology within his 
overall philosophical project. It depends on whether he interpreted most 
or all of those that he identifies as the central philosophical doctrines, 
developments, and disputes of the early modern period in the light of 
philosophers’ commitments to empiricism and rationalism.
 As we have seen, Kant interprets some of Locke’s, Hume’s, and Leib-
niz’s doctrines in the light of their empiricism and rationalism. These are 
Locke’s and Leibniz’s views on the origin of concepts, Locke’s proof of the 
existence of God, and Hume’s account of the origin of the notion of cause. 
Kant also suggests that Locke’s and Hume’s philosophy of mathematics 
is best assessed in the light of their empiricism.45 Additionally, Kant 
interprets one early modern development, the development from Locke 
to Hume, in the light of the notion of empiricism. Finally, he explains 
the divergence between Locke and Leibniz on the origin of concepts as 
a divergence between Locke’s empiricism and Leibniz’s rationalism.
 There are several other early modern doctrines and developments that 
Kant does not interpret in the light of the RED. I will provide examples 
concerning Bacon, Descartes, and Berkeley. Kant holds that a central 
development at the roots of early modern thought is the emergence of a 
new method for natural philosophy based on experiments and observa-
tions. Like his contemporaries, Johann Nikolaus Tetens and Christian 
Garve, Kant praises Bacon for pioneering this new method.46 Tetens and 
Garve held that Locke and Hume applied Bacon’s method to the study of 
the human mind.47 Many authors after Kant would make similar claims, 
linking Bacon to Locke and Hume in their accounts of early modern 
empiricism. Unlike them, Kant does not relate Bacon’s reliance on ob-
servations and experiments to Locke’s and Hume’s empiricism. Kant’s 
lecture transcripts do not mention Locke or Hume, but Descartes as a 
follower of Bacon’s new method.48
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 Kant sees Descartes as a source of important early modern doctrines. 
He often mentions and criticizes the cogito argument, Descartes’s view 
that introspection is more trustworthy than the outer senses, and his 
version of the ontological argument for the existence of God (for example, 
A355, B274–75, A347/B405). From a Kantian standpoint, the cogito 
argument and Descartes’s version of the ontological argument could be 
good examples of the rationalist attempt to establish synthetic claims 
independently of experience. Yet Kant never includes these or other 
Cartesian arguments within a history of early modern rationalism. He 
never groups Descartes, Malebranche, or Spinoza together with Leibniz 
so as to provide a rationalist counterpart to his account of how Hume’s 
skepticism derived from Locke’s empiricism.
 Instead of grouping Descartes together with Spinoza and Leibniz, 
Kant categorizes him as an idealist together with Berkeley—another 
author who, since Kant first replied to the Garve-Feder review in the 
Prolegomena, was important in his eyes but was never categorized as an 
empiricist or a rationalist. Kant does not articulate any account of early 
modern thought based on the evolution of idealism or its contrast with 
realism. More fundamental than idealism and realism, empiricism and 
rationalism, are to him the three categories of dogmatism, skepticism, 
and Critical philosophy or Criticism. The unfinished manuscript on the 
Progress of Metaphysics identifies them repeatedly as the three main 
stages in the history of metaphysics, and the first Critique begins and 
ends by locating Kant’s critical philosophy with respect to the antago-
nism between dogmatism and skepticism (Avii-xii, A855–56/B883–84). 
Yet he typically describes them in abstract terms, with few or no ref-
erences to early modern philosophers. He could have easily combined 
the distinction between dogmatism, skepticism, and Criticism with the 
distinction between empiricism and rationalism, identifying them as the 
two varieties of dogmatism that can be found in the early modern period. 
The distinction between empiricism, rationalism, and skepticism could 
then have provided a template for a comprehensive account of early 
modern thought that focuses on epistemological issues. Karl Leonhard 
Reinhold would provide such an account as early as in 1791.49 Unlike 
Reinhold and many authors after him, Kant did not provide any such 
account. He interpreted some, but not most, of the central philosophical 
doctrines, developments, and disputes of the early modern period in the 
light of the distinction between empiricism and rationalism. Not Kant 
but his followers employed the epistemological dichotomy of empiricism 
and rationalism as the overarching organizing principle for the history 
of early modern thought.
6. Kant’S contRiBution to the StandaRd naRRative  
of eaRly ModeRn philoSophy
Although Kant did not have the classificatory, Kantian, and epistemo-
logical biases that characterize the standard narrative of early modern 
philosophy, he promoted a way of writing histories of philosophy from 
which those biases would naturally flow. He did so by endorsing four 
tenets.
(a) The history of philosophy is a philosophical discipline. Kant took 
the section of the first Critique on the history of pure reason to 
designate “a place that is left open in the system” of philosophy 
(A852/B880). This provides “a secure touchstone for appraising 
the philosophical content of old and new works in this specialty” 
(B27). Historians should assess past philosophies from a Kantian 
point of view.
(b) Historians of philosophy should reconstruct the “natural train 
of thought through which philosophy had to progressively de-
velop from human reason” (Briefwechsel, 12:36). The “temporal 
sequence” of dogmatism, skepticism, and Criticism “is founded 
in the nature of man’s cognitive capacity” (Fort., 20:264). Given 
the nature of human psychology, humans have an inclination to 
embrace dogmatism, discover its flaws, move on to skepticism, 
be dissatisfied by it, and keep searching until they reach the safe 
haven of Criticism. Historians of philosophy should show how the 
temporal sequence of specific systems exemplifies this natural 
psychological development of the human mind.
(c) Given the nature of human psychology, it is unavoidable that 
humans go through the three stages of dogmatism, skepticism, 
and Criticism. Historians should make the unavoidability of this 
process apparent. They should show how the “opinions which 
have chanced to arise here and there” instantiate “what should 
have happened,” how reason must necessarily develop “himself 
from concepts” (Fort., 20:343).
(d) In line with his tendency to endorse intermediate views between 
two extremes, as discussed above, Kant regards his Critical 
philosophy as a middle way between the extremes of dogmatism 
and skepticism. It combines the dogmatists’ claim that we can 
know the external world with the skeptics’ claim that we can-
not know mind-independent objects. Historians of philosophy 
should describe this historical movement from the two extremes 
of dogmatism and skepticism to their higher synthesis in Kant’s 
Critical philosophy.
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Although Kant regarded his philosophy as a synthesis of dogmatism 
and skepticism, he did not regard it as a synthesis of empiricism and 
rationalism as such. He also employed a pattern of argument based on 
the rejection, unification, and overcoming of dichotomies into a third 
viewpoint. The standard historiography of early modern philosophy 
saw the light once Reinhold, Tennemann, and others picked up Kant’s 
notions of rationalism and history-empiricism; they employed Kant’s 
dialectical pattern of argument to portray his philosophy as a higher 
synthesis of those movements; and they followed Kant’s advice by 
writing philosophical histories of philosophy. Their histories exhibit 
the inexorable, necessary process (c) whereby human reason naturally 
evolved (b) from two unacceptable, extreme positions to Kant’s higher (a), 
intermediate (d) point of view. Post-Kantian historians developed this 
narrative by focusing on epistemological issues, classifying most early 
modern thinkers as empiricists or rationalists and portraying Kant’s 
philosophy as a synthesis of both movements. Kant did not have these 
three biases. Yet, given his influence on the standard historiography, it 
should not be surprising that it retains a Kantian flavor.
7. concluSion
In this paper, I have argued that Kant did not have the three biases, 
although he indirectly contributed to the development of the standard 
narrative. The first historians who developed accounts of early modern 
philosophy that revolve around the RED and display the three biases 
did this by employing Kantian notions and embracing Kantian views 
on the historiography of philosophy.
 According to the Kantian historian par excellence, Wilhelm Gottlieb 
Tennemann, “[t]he Critical inquiries of the philosopher from Königsberg 
had the most beneficial consequences not only for philosophy itself, but 
also for the history of philosophy.”50 Nowadays, few would agree that the 
consequences of Kant’s views on the historiography of philosophy were 
the most beneficial. Nevertheless, Kant’s views had a remarkable influ-
ence on how many philosophers have understood their early modern 
predecessors. It is important to recognize the extent to which their un-
derstanding was shaped by Kantian views on the nature of philosophical 
historiography. This should alert us to the wide-ranging consequences 
that historians’ assumptions on the nature and method of philosophical 
historiography can have for the way they reconstruct their philosophical 
past. To be aware of this is especially important now, when the limits of 
the traditional historiography of early modern philosophy have become 
apparent and many are looking for new, enhanced narratives.51
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